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Immigration Act in the United Kingdom 
Allen White 
Abstract 
Over the last decadeanda halftheinter- 
national refugee rkgime,as enshrined by 
the 1951 Convention and 1967Protocol 
has come undersus taineda ttackin wes t- 
ern states. This is because of implicit as- 
sumptions about the universalism of the 
refugee identity and the rootedness of 
national identities by theframers, draft- 
ers and subsequen t cornmen tutors on in- 
ternational refugee law (see Malkki 
1992, and Hyndman 1998). Critical 
approaches to international refugee law 
have suferedfrom underdeveloped ideas 
about space and about the relationship 
between geography and law. In this paper 
I point to geographical and geopolitical 
assumptions and thinking that lies be- 
hind the passage and enforcement of ac- 
celerated asylum determination and 
appeal procedures in the United King- 
dom. I conclude by suggesting how the 
moral landscape of refugee and asylum 
law might be re-orien ted to stress connec- 
tions between the United Kingdom and 
persecuted and oppressed peoples rather 
than stress the protection of the UK's 
boundaries. 
Dans les quinze dernihes anntes, le rk- 
gime international des rtifu@s, p r h d  
par leconvention de 1951 et 1eProtocole 
de 1967, a fait l'objet d'attaques intensi- 
ves duns les ttats occiden taux. Cela tient 
ri un certain nombre de prises de parti 
implicites, dues aux lkgisla teurs initiaux 
et aux divers commen ta teurs ul thieurs 
des lois internationales sur les r ~ ~ s ,  
sur la question de l'universalitkde l'iden- 
titk de rtifugit et de l'enracinement des 
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identitbnationales (voirMalkki 1992 et 
Hyrtdman 1998). Les approches criti- 
ques des lois internationales en matihe 
de refuge ont muffart d'iddes ma1 klabo- 
rkes sur l'organisation de l'espace, et sur 
la relation qui s'ktablit entre@ographie 
et droit. Dans cet article j'attire l'atten- 
tion sur les ptises de parti et opinions de 
nature gkographique et gkopolitique qui 
sous- tenden t la mise en place et 1 'applica- 
tion des dkterminations acc4lhkes du 
droit d'asile et des proct?dures d'appel 
afhentes, au Royaume-Uni. le conclus 
en suggkrant de quellefagm ledispositif 
moral des lois sur les @@ks et le droit 
d'asile dmai t  &re rkorientkpourmieux 
rflkter les liens entre le Royaume-Uniet 
les peuples oppridset pers&utt!s,plut8t 
que de s'en tenir h une emphase sur la 
protection desfrontiW du Royaume- 
Uni. 
Introduction 
The establishment and development of 
a international legal regime designed 
specifically to protect refugees cannot 
be totally isolated from a description, 
however brief, of the conditions and cir- 
cumstances that lay behind its incep- 
tion. In a certain light this history is a 
central part of the history of the 20th 
century, and is part of the horrors and 
carnage of what has been described as 
the "most terrible century in Western 
history" (Berlin, quoted in Hobsbawm 
1994). Most commentators place the 
emergence of a recognizable "refugee 
problem" in the rise of nationalism at 
the end of the nineteenth century and 
especially in the first decades if the 20th 
century (see Marrus 1985, Loescher 
1993, and Joly 1996). The consolidation 
of new and emerging nation-states re- 
quired the rewriting of "community" 
and "belongingw around ideas of na- 
tional unity on ethnic, religious and 
cultural grounds, these emerging na- 
tionalisms included and excluded spe- 
cific populations in particular territo- 
ries. The political map of the world 
changed from a premodern "riot of di- 
verse points of colour . . . such that no 
clear pattern can be discerned in any 
detail" to a modem map of "little shad- 
ing; neat flat surfaces . . . there is very 
little, if any ambiguity or overlap" 
(Gellner, 1983 quoted in Malklci 1992). 
In the first half of the 20th century refu- 
gees emerged as a relatively new inter- 
national problem, caught between 
nation states that rejected them and 
states that would not accept them 
(Marrus 1985; Loescher 1993). At the 
end of the both world wars millions of 
people were homeless, stateless and 
deprived of their human rights, this had 
never been seen before (Marrus 1985; 
Loescher 1993). The international re- 
sponse to these stateless and rightless 
people was created and constructed in 
thecontext of these assumptions about 
citizenship, sovereignty and thenatim- 
state. 
The details of specific national myth 
building and the many different 
unfoldings of these nationalisms are 
not really the central or principal con- 
cerns to Ws paper, instead we should 
acknowledge that these processes form 
the backdrop to the establishment and 
development of the international legal 
refugee r6gime in the 20th century. 
Xenos (1993) writes for these reasons 
the refugeeis the "modern political con- 
dition," a sentiment that echoes 
Arendt's more passionate description 
of modem refugees who 
unlike their happier predecessors in 
the religious wars, were welcomed 
nowhere and could be assimilated 
nowhere. Once they had left their 
homeland they remained homeless, 
once they had left their state they 
became stateless; once they had been 
deprived of their human rights they 
were rightless, the scum of the earth. 
(Arendt 1%7,267) 
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Underlying assumptions in interna- 
tional refugee law that cbdm the world 
can be easily divided into discreet units 
of sovereign states are not especially 
surprising given the common-sense 
practice of rooting pattieular peoples to 
particular places in Western political 
thought and culture and the ubiquity of 
territorialized concepts in everyday 
(and academic) language-"native 
soils," "homeland," "land" and "moth- 
erland" arecasesin point (Mallcki 1992). 
Naturalizing and botanid metaphors 
have been mobilized throughout his- 
tory to conceive the relations between a 
"people" and a "place" producing a 
"sedentrisim rooting people to places 
(ibid.). This is not an inert process; it 
actively pathologizes the displaced. 
Refugees, lacking a bodily connection 
to national territories,have been treated 
as having a lack of moral bearings 
(ibid.). This is most obvious in the post- 
war literattllPanrefugeeshmvevermod- 
ern refugee studies and international 
refugeelaw still construct refugees as a 
"problem," marginahin8 other and 
alternative refugee identities (ibid.). 
We can argue then that the construc- 
tion and framing of international refu- 
gee law depends on conceptions of a 
word divided into fixed units of sover- 
eign states that peoples' identities are 
built within. International refugee law 
is stilted because it cannot take into ac- 
m t  more open smd fluid redugee iden- 
titiesbecause the refugee identity itself 
was patholgized in the immediate post 
war period. To be a refugeie one must 
have suffered persecution, this persecu- 
tion takes a highly specific form (based 
on ideological priorities of the West in 
the Cold War) there is no spqce in inter- 
national refugee law to recognize less 
fixed and sedentary identities as legiti- 
mate refugees. Thus environmental 
refugees, female refugees or other 
groups of refugees are "written out" of 
the Geneva Convention. Through root- 
ing refugee identities within these fixed 
ideas about the nation, identity and 
place international refugee law allows 
national asylum and immigration laws 
to "silence8' these refugee identities. 
Legitimate refugee identities and narra- 
tives, at a stroke are deemed "bogus" or 
"non-Convention" refugees. 
Another consequence of conceptual- 
izing the world as divided into autono- 
mous and sovereign states, is that 
international refugee law, and byexten- 
sion international human rights law, is 
seen as means of delimiting state sover- 
eignty (Malkki 1992; Hathaway 1991; 
andGoodwMilll983). The 1951 Con- 
vention guarantees refugees the right to 
seek asylum in signatory states but un- 
der international law it is an optional 
right of each state to grant or refuse asy- 
lum (Macdonald and Blake 1991; see 
also Lambert 1995). Thus, although it 
holds considerable symbolic power, the 
1951 Convention does not explicitly 
cha3lenge any signatory state's discre- 
tionary right to grant asylum 
(Macdonald and Blake 1991). The only 
obligation on states expressed in the 
Convention is contained in Article 33 
which expressly forbids states from for- 
cibly returning asylum-seekers to 
states, where they may face persecution, 
subject to certain conditions specified 
under the Convention. This principle of 
non-refouhent has evolved into a rule 
of customary law and has exposed ten- 
sions between aims and objectives of 
international and national legal sys- 
tems such that: 
&.the one hand, a State may choose 
to ensure compliance with its inter- 
mtional obligations in various ways: 
there is no international requirement 
that thescope of these obligations be 
justicable in the State's own courts 
and tribunals. On the other hand a 
State is not entitled to rely on its do- 
mestic law to avoid its international 
res~onsibilities. and thus if decisions 
on ihose respo&ibilities are made by 
the executive government, it is the 
executive gov&nment which must 
ensure that the international law ar- 
guments are adequately dealt with. 
(Crawford and Hyndman 1989,157) 
Thus international refugee and hu- 
man rights law act as humanitarian 
benchmarks for domestic legislation, 
while in practice state law is used to 
govern a international human rights 
~~e by states who see themselves as 
self-governing (Hathaway 1991). There 
is recognition that the universal human- 
ist rhetoric of the original Geneva Con- 
vention is flawed (see Greatbach, 1989; 
Crawley 1997; and Crawford and 
Hyndman 1989). Indeed the autono- 
mous neutral and sovereign subject of 
humanism has been "widely accepted 
. . . [as] a fiction" (Gregory 1994, 265, 
quoted in Hyndman 1998,246). Many of 
these commentators seek to mobilize 
fresh interpretations of the Geneva Con- 
vention as part of a continuing project of 
using international refugee law as an 
exclusive site of struggle for promoting 
human rights around the world (and 
particularly in Western states) (Harvey 
1997a). However this universalist hu- 
manitarianism that the Geneva Con- 
vention refugee definition and 
international refugee law is based upon 
acts to undermine the effective protec- 
tion that international refugee law can 
promise refugees because it masks the 
unequal relations between states and 
groups of people-illegal immigrants, 
asylum seekers, economic migrants etc. 
(Hyndman 1998). 
There are then at least two ways 
(pathologizing displacement and a 
universalist humanitarianism) in 
which implicit and explicit assump- 
tions and discouses have informed and 
constructed an international legal refu- 
gee regime that effectively works 
against the role that international refu- 
gee law sees itself playing. The absence 
of any tradition of explicit criticism from 
within refugee law is noteworthy- 
Harvey (1997a, 507) has commented 
that there is a sense that refugee law is 
"intrinsically critical." Tuitt (1996) has 
made aconvincing case that refugee law 
actively functions to bar many of those 
whoneed protection and refugee status. 
Using refugee law she argues that the 
west has consistently prioritizing the 
reduction of the external costs of refugee 
movements (ibid.). Refugee law reduces 
the definition of a refugee to include only 
very few applicants; refugee law shifts 
the burden to first asylum countries 
(who are often in no position to deal 
with large populations of refugees); 
refugee law emphasizes movement 
across international borders as a pri- 
mary requirement of refugee identity 
containing the sick, the old, the young 
and rnargmalhd within the perseaat- 
ing state (ibid.). Inequality kt built into 
and part of the refugee definition and the 
international legal rkgime. 
Tuitt's approach is strongest when 
directed at the inequalities and biases of 
the international legal Agime. However 
her arguments become less original as 
the analysis turns to the UK's domestic 
asylum and immigration legislation. A 
more sophisticated conception of space 
in an analysis of refugee law might help 
reveal potentially emandpatory reflec- 
tions on refugee law. A detailed analy- 
sis would reveal the geo-political 
assumptions and thinking that under- 
pin the enactment and passage of asy- 
lum legislation in particular contexts. A 
detailed case study would also reveal 
the geographical and geopolitical 
thinking and biases that structure and 
inform practices in decision making 
and enforcement in particular places. 
Finally a casestudy may help lead us to 
certain conclusions about how regula- 
tions and the law are formed and 
practiced and how they might be re- 
formed in different ways to producedif- 
ferent conclusions and determinations 
of asylum cases. 
With these points in mind I will see if 
looking at the UK's Asylum and Immi- 
gration legislation can help reveal how 
geographical and geo-political as- 
sumptions about social, political and 
economic realities have structured 
present legislation and practices. 
Firstly, however we need to examine the 
connections between geography and 
law. 
Geography and Law- 
Interpretative Communities 
There are progressive perspectives on 
law, informed by critical social theory 
and critical legal studies, that actively 
address the links between geography 
and law. The relationship between ge- 
ography (meaning here in its broad 
sense--context) and law (acontextual) 
is inherently unstable, as Pue (1990) 
argues geography is by its very nature 
insurrectionary to the hegemonic view 
of law. The 1990s has seen a growing 
awareness about the relationship be- 
tween geography and law (Urban Geog- 
~ l o m l e ~  and  lark 1990; ~ l o m l e ~  1994; 
Chouinard 1994; Delaney 1998; and 
Cooper 1998). This interest inestablish- 
ing and pursuing connections does 
originate from within both disciplines, 
although geographers have talcenmore 
interest in law and legal issues than 
lawyers and legal exerts have in geogra- 
phy (Pue 1990). There is no one domi- 
nant consensus over the ways in which 
law and geography interact, indeed 
there are almost as many different ap- 
proaches as there are researchers inthe 
area, which is, if anything a sign of the 
novelty of this area of research. The re- 
cent theoretical approaches and analy- 
ses have in common an expansion of 
ideas about the relationship between 
the legal and the geographical beyond 
the narrowly defined model of "impact 
analysis" of a law onto a static spatial 
structure e.g. the housing structure. In- 
stead, adopting critical legal perspec- 
tives has lead some to argue that law is 
"an open textured arena of discourse" 
which conditions the way in which we 
conceive of social life (Blomley 1992, 
238). Side stepping positivist critiques 
of such an interpretative analysis of law 
Clark argues that interpretation itself is 
a social act and a practice organized 
around shared social rules and codes of 
behaviour in particular spatial and so- 
cial contexts (Clark 1989). Thus law is 
essentially an interpretative process 
that takes place in particular interpreta- 
tive communities and contexts, for ex- 
ample government, the courts or the 
legislative. 
So we can try and use these theoreti- 
cal insights to reveal the unacknowl- 
edged discourses, assumptions and 
truth claims behind asylum law in the 
United Kingdom, and how these struc- 
ture the ways in which asylum seeking 
is understood and viewed by policy 
makers. I am going to highlight two 
ways in which the system for asylum 
claims and appeals as laid out in the 
UK's Asylum and Immigration Act (19%) 
are based upon particular geographies 
and ideas about space. The parts of the 
acts I shall be looking at in detail are the 
accelerated procedures as set out by a) 
The Short Procedure and Won 
One White List Cases 
As the name implies the Short Proce- 
dure shortens the length of time taken 
over asylum applications and is aimed 
at accelerating the initial determination 
of claims for asyluni. Section One of the 
19% Asylum and Immigration Act is an- 
other example of accelerated proce- 
durestomavecaseslquicklythnrughthe 
asylum system, d i k e  theshort Proce- 
dure, Section One is aimed at accelerat- 
ing post decision appeal procedures of 
challenge and review.TheShortProce- 
dure was a Home Office policy shift and 
requirednolegislativechanges. Section 
One *eel to accelerate the appeals 
procedure which had been outlined in 
the previous 1993 Asylum and Immigm- 
tion Appeals Act (1943). Thischange then 
required primary !egislation, Section 
One is part of the 1996Asylumand Immi- 
p t ion Act, For a the, over 1995 and 
19%, accelerated procedures were in- 
troduced for pre- and post- 
determinations of dsylum claims in the 
Unitedm$dom. 
The Short Procdure 
Prior to the introduction of the Short 
Procedure the standard (London based) 
procedurefor dealing with asylum ap- 
plications made frdm within the United 
Kingdom was to go to the Asylum 
Screening Unit (A!%') at Lunar House in 
Croydon. There the asylumseeker was 
given a Self Completed Questionnaire 
(SCQ) on Ihis/her asylum claim-re- 
turnable within 28 days. The applicant 
was given advancd warning of the asy- 
lumintervlew, and representations and 
evidencecouldbepresentedtotheHame 
Office up until thedecisioit to accept or 
reject the asylum claim was made. 
This arrangement changed under 
theShortProcedure.Underthenewpro- 
cedures the asylum seeker is not given a 
SCQ, the intenriew is held on the stme 
day as the initial claim to the ASU, fur- 
ther representations and evidencemust 
be presented tothe Hame Offhover the 
next 5 working days and a decision is 
made within3 weeks (Jagmohan 19%). 
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Short Procedure iqbrviews are shorter 
and less detailed than other interviews 
and suffer from a rangeof problems that 
typify asylum intetviews; the chrond- 
ogy of the i n m w  is6ackwards;trans- 
lation and interpretatians can be 
inaccurate; the asylum seeker is often 
exhausted after a l m  and tiring jour- 
ney; the interview is the main source of 
information for the asylum claim a fact 
that the asy1umsee@rmaynotbeaware 
of (Refugee Legal Centre 1997a). Often 
the procedures are indeed "short," 
proper representation in interviews ig 
importantbut imp@blebgcause inter- 
views are o h  hew on the same day as 
the initial asylum dam, this can disori- 
ent asylum s d c e t ~  aagmohan 1996). 
Under the Short Pmcedurearsylumseek- 
ers are coerced intaasylum interviews, 
which are usually W sole wcasion for 
telling their story, withouq any allow- 
ance made for trautpa, fa-, distress, 
confusion and unfiamiliarity with the 
asylumproceclures@kfugee LegalCen- 
tre 1997a). Whenhe at the port of entry 
the Short Procedure inkrviews are car- 
ried out by -ation odficers who 
have no specialized training in asylum 
law and the political and social situa- 
tion of other coun 'es. In addition the 
place and site of a intervi~w itself, in 
airports or ferry ports can be threaten- 
ingenvironments. 
The Home Officae has argued that if 
asylum interviews take place immedi- 
ately after the initial claim for asylum 
the asylum seeker's memory of events 
will be fresher (Jagmohan 1996). This 
rationale fundamentally misunder- 
stands the nature of asylllm claims. 
Asylum claims are rarely the result of 
particularpereaution eventsi, claims are 
more usually madq after many events, 
often years of incrqmental acts of har- 
assment, ~ t i m a n d p e r ~ e c u -  
tion (ibid.). Home Office thrnking is 
illustrated during We interview when 
asylum seekers are asked, "What par- 
ticular event caused you to leave your 
country" after coveting travel and fam- 
ily details (ibid.). 4 question like this, 
that prompts the r+spon&nt to high- 
light a single event oreventa, is an inap 
propate means of drawing the full 
details about an as*um claim. In many 
cases follow up questions may not be 
asked, asylum seekers (without good 
representation) have no indication of 
the level of detail required to success- 
fully claim asylum and may (reason- 
ably) assume that details arenot needed 
as the interviewing officer hasn't asked 
for them (ibid.). 
TheHomeOffice, whenmovingpeo- 
ple through the Short Procedure, implic- 
itly acknowledges the need for advice 
for asylum seekers by giving them, be- 
fore their interview, a leaflet entitled 
Information about Your Asylum Claim 
aagrnohan 19%). However the infor- 
mation contained in the leaflet is far 
fromsatisfadory.Thereisnomentionof 
the 1951 Convention definition, the cri- 
teria for being recognized a refugee, asy- 
lum seekers are told to give details of 
harassment and detention and not to 
give general country descriptions as 
theix interviewing officer willbe famil- 
iar with the situation in their home 
country -often not the case (ibid.). The 
leaflet fails to mention the right to an 
interpreter, to a copy of the interview 
notes and the procedure for submitting 
medical evidence, in sum the leaflet, 
published only in English, falls short of 
the advice available from a competent 
representative in a situation when cir- 
cumstances can ad  to deny the presence 
of a representative (ibid.). 
In May 1995 the Home Office intro- 
duced a pilot short procedure scheme to 
accelerate determinations of asylum 
claims from thenationals of eight coun- 
tries, covering asylum claims whether 
they were made on entry or in country. 
Those countries were: Ghana, Nigeria, 
Uganda, India, Pakistan, Romania, Po- 
land and Sri Lanka. 
Reservations about the pilot scheme 
were voiced, on its introduction the 
Asylum Rights Campaign protested 
that the scheme would "impair the abil- 
ity af a genuine refugee to properly rep- 
resent his or her testimony" (ibid., 1). 
All applications for asylum deter- 
mined under the pilot Short Procedure 
were rejected, the scheme was declared 
a success by the Home Office and was 
expanded to include another 28 coun- 
tries It covers asylum claimsfrom all 
countries bar a selected few and those 
specific cases that, at the Home Office's 
discretion, could be considered 
substantively. The countries that are 
exempt are: Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, 
Libya, Gulf States (bar Kuwait), Soma- 
lia, Liberia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Croatia, 
former Yugoslavia and Palestine (ibid.). 
However exactly how the Home Of- 
fice assessed the success of the pilot 
scheme remains amystery to outsiders- 
there were no external assessments of 
the interviews held or of decisionsmade I 
by the Home Office, there were also no .. 
consultations with asylum seekers put 
through the scheme. The Home Office 
pointed tothe 100percent refusal rate as 
evidence that the scheme properly pin- 
pointed fraudulent claims and ex- 
panded the scheme before any appeals 
to these refusals were heard (ibid.). It is 
likely that the scheme would havebeen 
expanded regardless of the findings of 
any report. 
Section One White List Cases 
Section One of the 1996 Asylum and Im- 
migration Act sought to establish the cri- 
teria whereby claims could be certified 
as bogus or without foundation after 
consideration by the Home Office. An 
asylum claim rejected and certified un- 
der Section One is put into an acceler- 
ated appeals procedure: asylum seekers 
were only given two days to lodge an 
appeal after a rejection; appeals could 
only be taken to the Speaal Adjudicator 
level with no further appeal allowed; 
adjournment rules were tightened; and 
the Special Adjudicators rulings had to 
be ready within 10 days (Harvey 1997a). 
Invariably questions were raised about 
the UK's commitment to efficient admin- 
istration at the expense of competent 
adjudication. 
The drawing up of a "white list" of 
countries where the Secretary of State 
has determined that there is "in general 
no serious risk of persecution" raised 
some of the loudest objections. The 
countries named were Bulgaria, India, 
Cyprus, Pakistan, Ghana, Poland and 
Romania (Young 1997). The only cred- 
ible interpretation of this "whitelist" of 
countries is that the nationality and 
origin of the asylum seeker automati- 
cally precludes the application from 
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being genuine which raises questkm 
about the commitment of the United 
Kingdom to individualized considera- 
tion of asylum claims (Refugee Legal 
Centre 1997a; and Harvey 199%). 
Section One certificates are also is- 
sued in cases that do not raise 1951 
Convention grounds for persecution, 
where the Home Office considers the 
case to be "unfounded or frivolous" or 
where the asylum seeker has failed to 
either produce proper documentation 
or to have given a valid explanation for 
not producing proper documentation 
(Harvey 199%). Clearly these are ex- 
tremely wide grounds for restricting 
appeal rightsbut the rationale for certi- 
fying cases under Section One that has 
raised the most objection has been the 
"white list" of safe countries (Young 
1997). 
Used in conjunction the Short Proce- 
dure and Section One can mean that an 
asylum application from country X (for 
example Romania) is put through an 
accelerated determination procedure, 
the claim is viewed as unfounded, certi- 
fied under Section One of the 1996 act 
and put through accelerated appeal 
procedures, reducing an appeal's 
chance to overturn the refusal,.so fewer 
cases are granted asylum (Jagmohan 
1996). 
Legal Geographies 
A sigruficant detail about the introduc- 
tion of the Short Procedure and Sedion 
One of the 1996 Act is that both are de- 
pendent on particular assumptions 
about "persecution," politics and hu- 
man rights in the world. Both are based 
on some kind of assessment of different 
parts of the world, dividing the world 
intol'safe and unsafe" places, countries 
and regions, In other words the Short 
Procedureand Sectionone arebased on 
specific political geographies organ- 
ized and defined by the Home Office. 
For the Short Procedure the produc- 
tion of these country lists was secret and 
not debated in public. The Home Office 
has so far refused to explicitly state why 
some countries were added and others 
taken off, except to state that the Short 
Procedure exists independently of the 
"White list" of safe countries. Clearly 
thm@ a 
rok-dw Indu8ion of same countde 
(e.g., Algeria) and the omission of par- 
ticular countries (e.g., Iraq) from the 
Short Procedure shows an awareness of 
political sensitivities rather than any 
firm commitments to protection from 
human rights abuses (Jagmohan 1996). 
This is not just about particular foreign 
policy imperatives-Sri Lanka was in- 
cluded on the original list for inclusion 
into Pilot Short Procedure scheme-it 
was withdrawn after a government as- 
sault on the Jaffna peninsula increased 
Westem media attention on the civil 
war that has been ongoing for many 
years (ibid.). 
Because the introduction of Section 
One and theuse of a'lwhite list" of coun- 
tries presumed safe required the intro- 
duction of legislation the construction 
of this legislation was debated in the 
Houses of Parliament. These debates 
have beenexmninedelsewhere toreveal 
how they centred on the criteria for as- 
sessing and categorizing particular 
countries as safe or unsafe, which in 
turn depended on the deployment of 
politically constructed ideas about the 
geography of human rights (Young 
1997). 
The debates about this part of the act 
centred on the criteria for determining if 
a country there is "in general no serious 
risk" in particular countries. They in- 
clude: the stability of the country; state 
adherence to international human 
rights; the presence of democratic insti- 
tutions and the media; the availability 
of legal avenues for protection. Thus a 
country is designated onto or of the 
"white list" once the "reality" of its 
socio-political characteristics were 
evaluated (ibid.). The evaluations of 
these different "realities" werebased on 
a number of different assumptions. 
Firstly, the specific socio-political reali- 
ties for particular countries was as- 
sumed toexist for all people at all times 
in each country, ignoring the specific 
situations and positions of minority 
populations. Secondly, regional dis- 
parities in persecution that may be re- 
lated to ethnic or religious affiliations 
were also ignored. Thirdly, different 
and contradictory "realities" were mo- 
a g ~ t t h e i a c ~ a f ~ c ~  
tries onto the white Ust. 
In effect, then, the introduction of the 
Section One White List has seen the 
deployment and mobilization of spe- 
cific geographical and geo-political 
knowledge's about different countries 
in an effort to evaluate and assess social 
political redties ineach country (ibid.). 
Realities that are held to apply to all 
people in all parts of societies and 
across all parts of particular states 
(ibid.). Inshost then implicit andexplicit 
geopolitical knowledges and geo- 
graphical discourse$ about the nature 
and development of; civil and political 
society in different societies and con- 
texts across the world were mobilized 
over 1995-19% to introduce a range of 
accelerated procedures. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, we can place the introduc- 
tion of recent asylumlegislation and the 
construction and organization of the 
asylum detehninatim and appeals pro- 
cedures in ideas about the "moral land- 
scape" of refugee and asylumlaw in the 
United Kingdom. Recognizing persecu- 
tion and offering safe haven from perse- 
cution constructs thk world into "safe" 
places (states) and "unsafe" places 
(states) and the legu texts that do this 
are interconnected with other complex 
linguistic and cultural representations 
of the nation state, morality and power, 
producing a moral Mdscape of asylum 
(Kobayashi 1995). 'We" are a morally 
good nation when we accept "the perse- 
cuted" and do not "persecute" others 
(ibid.). Refugee law and the establish- 
mentof asylwnproceduresarepartof a 
whole series of lmpstic representa- 
tions and cultural kctivities that help 
define the moral authority and sover- 
eignty of modemstBtes (ibid.). 'Ihus the 
United Kingdom, because it is a 
"moral," "good" m d  "democratic" 
state, offers "sanctuary" to victims of 
persecution from "limmod," "ilkgiti- 
mate" and "despotic" dgimes. This 
moral landscape, most obviously asso- 
ciated with the ceftarinties of the Cold 
War, in the poet Cold War 1990s is itself 
being i;nvaiied,by "illegal immigrants" 
l 
and "hordes of bqgus applicants" who 
wish to abuse the United Kingdom's 
"proud tradition" of offering asylum. 
You rmght notice that the debate, such 
as it is, is more W l y  to concentrate on 
asylum seekers as opposed to asylum 
itself. 
When examirwd in a critical light 
and in any detail this m o d  landscape 
of refugee law in W UniW lhgdom 
crumbles. Intematiodrefugeelaw has 
beenconstrudedalnd~i$nedtoreflect 
Western interesQ and s- its incep 
tion has sought $0 cater for Western 
Europe's geo-po19tical interests (Tuitt 
1996). The intewtional legal rdgime's 
"inkrnational/h~unanitet.ian'~ ethos 
hasbeentherneqsandW?endsof this 
process, dismiss&g rival concepti0118 
of the refugee while at the same time 
legitimizing Westem intewts through 
the universalism of the "international/ 
humanitarian" ethic (Tuitt 1995). The 
1951 Convention definition has re- 
placed all other pteexisting and com- 
peting defini- of the refugee-the 
Convention defiqition has fossilized a 
parhal definition of the wfugee (Tuitt 
1996). 
Through this asylum law in the 
United KMgdom has acted as amedium 
and context for the contrsldion of the 
refugee identity through acombination 
of the restriction qf refugqe rights and 
the exercising 04 state power in an 
asylumdeterminqtion system that sys- 
tematically "0thop.s" and humiliates 
asylum seelrers and refugees (Paliwala 
1995; for a Canrdian erample see 
Kobayashi 1995). This sysitematic and 
oppressive rewritiqtg of refugee and asy- 
lum seeker's righlts is not inevitable, 
however. The law h alsoactmi, or has 
at least held the potemtial to act, in 
ntrancipatory waysi and can a d  in ways 
to perpetuate and also signifwantly to 
challenge " lived relations of oppres- 
sion" (Chouinard 1994, 430). As an 
example an Immipation Appeals Tri- 
bunal hearing rlpled on an appeal 
lodged by two Albianians from Kosovo 
that breaches of specific fundamental 
human rights amounted to persecution 
by the Serbian so&, linking the 1951 
Convention with IqternatiamaI Human 
Rights legislation in a -8 that pro- 
vided a new analysis of the meaning of 
persecution in British law (Refugee Le- 
gal Centre 199%). The adjudication of 
cases of asylum has represented an im- 
portant space where, occasionally sig- 
nificant legal victories have provided a 
context where rights for asylum seekers 
canbe defended and sometimes gained. 
A sl@cant example of this is the rec- 
ognition of gender based persecution in 
Canadian Immigration Law after a 
number of successful appeals to asylum 
refusals were argued before the Imrni- 
p t i o n  Appeals Board, aruling that has 
important implications for interna- 
tional law (Kobayashi 1995) 
Asylum law acts is an important 
agent in the complex web of discourses 
that define and express the moral land- 
scape of the nation, law is intimately 
involved with questions with what is 
good or bad for society, it isnot always 
about punishing wrongdoing. There is 
no reason why laws as moral dis- 
courses cannot be utilized to make con- 
nections between the United Kingdom 
and marginalized and persecuted peo- 
ple, rather than establish the bounda- 
ries and borders of a sovereign state. 
This might be based on ideas about ge- 
ography and asylum, the inversion of 
the Short Procedure and the White List. 
Geo-political representations may be 
employed to target and highlight asy- 
lum claims from specific countries, or 
from particular parts of different coun- 
tries as urgent and in need of attention. 
The moral locus of refugee law and its 
interpretation canbe related to specific 
circumstances in particular places. In 
other words, refugee law can (poten- 
tially) be mobilized to make a connec- 
tionbetween principles of social justice 
in areas of UK law (for example in rul- 
ings in Industrial Tribunals), with im- 
portant developments in asylum 
jurisprudence in other countries and 
the social and political conditions in 
other parts of the world. This would 
require a re-writing of the social and 
political realities that have been alluded 
to, a project in which geography could 
play an important role. 
A re-writing of the moral landscape 
of asylum law in the United Kingdom 
would also dispel the myth that flows of 
asylum seekers and refugees are some- 
thing that "just happens" to the United 
Kingdom (and other western states). In 
many cases western countries have 
played important parts in the creation 
of the social and political circumstances 
whereby people are persecuted and 
forced into fleeing their homes. For ex- 
ample the UK's arms trade to Sri Lanka, 
or the European Union's promotion of 
the ethnically divisive Vance-Owen 
peace plan in the Bosnian conflict (see 
also Black 1996). 
Although I am describing a culture 
change in Home Office practice from a 
culture of disbelief to a culture of belief 
this could have beneficial effects on the 
present asylum system. Shortening the 
procedures to protect in specific cases 
would a) reduce appeals b) reduce costs 
as system would not be so overloaded 
during determinations and appeals 
and c) abusive cases could be given ex- 
tra attention and dismissed. A recogni- 
tion of the complex geographies of 
persecution and oppression across the 
globe would, at least, point out the prob- 
lems of the universalist humanitarian- 
ism built into the present asylum 
determination system as well as ac- 
knowledge that different people and 
different groups are placed in unequal 
relation to each other. 
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